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THE SUPREME COURT'S THEORY OF A DIRECT TAX. 
T HE decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Pollock ease1 of I895 was the beginning of an attempt on the part 
of the court to formulate a new definition of a direct tax, 
and since that time in every case which has called for a decision as 
to whether a particular tax was a direct tax the court has reverted 
to and tried to harmonize its decision with the reasoning set forth 
in the Pollock case. This decision overturned a fairly definite and 
universally accepted definition of a direct tax which had existed 
for nearly a century. In order to understand the new view in con-
trast with the old we find it necessary to. review briefly the earlier 
period. 
With the one exception of a tax on exports the constitutional 
grant of power to Congress to levy taxes is plenary, subject to two 
regulations : 
( r) "* * * all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States."2 
(2) "No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in 
proportion to "the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to 
be taken."3 The same idea is expressed in another clause thus : 
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several states * * * according to their respective numbers."4 
Several investigations have been made of the records of the Con-
stitutional Convention of I7~7 and of the various state ratifying con-
ventions in order to determine what meaniu.g was atta.::lted to the 
term "direct tax."5 It is not necessary here to cover this ground 
again but it is sufficient to say tl~at. the authoritative opinion of 
those who have examined the records is that there was no definite 
meaning agreed upon in the Convention and that it was a vague 
term. One writer summarizes the situation thus: "Amid this 
diversity of opinion orily one thing is sure, namely, that no one knew 
exactly what was meant by ::i. direct tax, because no two people 
agreed."6 
~ 157 U. S. 429 and 158 U. S. 601. (1895). 
•Article 1, sec. 8, clause l. 
•Article l, sec. 9, clause 4. 
•Article l, sec. 2, clause 3. 
1 Seligman, E. R. A., The Income Tax. Macmillan; New York, 1914- Bullock, 
C. J., Origin, Purpose and Effect of the Dir~ct·Tax Clause· of the Federal Co,;stitution. 
Political Science Quarterly, XV, 217, 452. Morrow, D. W., The Income Tax Amend-
ment. Columbia I.aw Review, X, 379. 
• Seligman, p. 569. 
WHAT IS A DIRECT TAX? 
EARLY CASES. 
In 1794 Congress levied a tax on carriages "for the convenience 
of persons which shall be kept by or for any person for his or her 
own use, or to be let out for hire, or for the conveying of pas-
sengers." The law was attacked as unconstitutional on the ground 
that it enacted a direct tax, which therefore should be apportioned. 
The matter came before the Supreme Court in the Hylton case.7 
HAMILTON, who argued the case for the Government, said, in part: 
"What is the distinction between direct and indirect taxes? It is a 
matter of regret that terms so uncertain and vague in so important 
a point are to be found in the Constitution. We shall seek in vain 
for any antecedent settled legal meaning to the respective terms-
there is none." After pointing out the difficulty of applying the 
rule of shiftability, or incidence, or of making consciousness of 
paying it the test of a direct tax, he urged an interpretation which 
would permit the National Government to exercise the powers given 
-one of which was clearly the power to levy taxes. "The boundary, 
[between direct and indirect taxes] then," he ~rgued, "must be 
fixed by a species of arbitration, and ought to be such as will in-
volve neither absurdity nor inconvenience." Then followed HAMIL-
TON'S distinction: "The following are presumed to be the only 
direct taxes : capitation or poll taxes ; taxes on lands and buildings ; 
general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals, 
or on their whote real or personal estate. All else must of necessity 
be considered as indirect taxes." 
The court accepted HAMILTON'S reasoning and the three judges 
who delivered opinions took the stand that only taxes which could 
be apportioned should be considered direct taxes.8 In his opiniol).. 
Justice CHASE delivered the following dictum:· "I am inclined to' 
think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct 
taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to-wit, a 
capitation or poll tax, simply without regard to property, profession, 
or any other circumstance; and a tax on land. I doubt whether a 
tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United 
States, is included within the term direct tax:' 
Justice PATTERSON said: "Whether direct taxes, in the sense of 
the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax, 
and tax on land, is a questionable point/' 
Justice IREDELL said: " Perhaps a direct tax, in the sense of the 
Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably 
•Hylton v. United States. 3 Dallas 111. Cz796>. 
• J ustlces Chase, Patterson, and Iredell. 
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annexed to th~ soil, something capable of apportionment .under all 
such circumstances." 
The decision in the Hylton case was that a tax on carriages was 
a tax on expense _and therefore an excise and not a direct tax. 
In Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule,9·the court held that a tax 
on the incomes of insurance companies was an indirect tax. The 
difficulty of apportionment was again emphasized in the opinion and 
there was a tendency to make the possibility of apportionment the 
test of a direct tax. The dicta of the judges in the Hylton case, 
that probably capitation taxes and taxes on land are the only direct 
taxes within the Constitution, were quoted. 
In Veazie Bank v. F enno,1° a· tax on state-bank notes was held to 
be not a direct tax. The Hylton case was again relied upon. The court 
said: "It may be rightly affirmed, therefore, that in the practical 
construction of the Constitution by Congress, direct taxes have been 
limited to taxes on land and appurtenances, and taxes on polls, or 
capitation taxes." 
In Scholey v. Rew,11 the court held that an inheritance tax was 
an indirect tax on the ground of its similarity in principle to the 
income tax which had already been declared to be constitutional. 
Finally an income tax which had been imposed on incjividuals 
came up in the case of Springer v. United States.12 The court said: 
"Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the 
Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instru-
ment, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plain-
tiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty."13 
THE INCOME TAX CASE OF 1895. 
The income tax law of 1894 came before the court in the case of 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company14 and was held un-
constitutional. Since there was not a full bench at the first hearing 
and there- was an even division of those justices present on some 
•7 Wallace 433. (1868) 
14 8 Wallace 533. (1869). 
u 23 Wallace 331. (1874) • 
. .. 102 u. s. 586. (1880). 
u In the meantime Congress had levied direct truces under the rule of apportion· 
ment in 1798, 1813, 1815, 1816, and s861. The first four were limited to lands, im· 
provements, dwellinit houses. and slav"ll. The act of 1861 omitted slaves from the 
above list. 
Tho leadinQ'.· constitutional authorities such as Chancellor Kent, Justfoe Story, 
Cooley, and Justice Mil~~ had acoepted this "speoies, of a~bitration" by Hamilton and 
it seemed to be an established rule. 
St 157 U. S. 42!1 and 158 U. S. 6o1. (1Sg5). 
W-HAT IS A DIRECT TAX? 
of the questions at issue, a rehearing was granted and a second 
opinion given. The opinion in 157 U. S., may be summarized thus: 
(I) A tax on income from real estate is a tax on real estate, because 
the distinction between that which gives value to property and the 
property itself is a forced one. (2) A tax on real estate is a direct 
tax. (3) Therefore, a tax on income from real estate is a direct tax. 
The results of the second opinion may be stated thus : (I) A 
general income tax is a general property tax. ( 2) Where the power 
lacks tp tax a source- it lacks to tax the income therefrom. (3) 
Power lacks to levy an unapportioned general property tax, there-
fore it lacks to levy an unapportioned general income tax. The 
fallacy in this reasoning lies in the assumption that any tax on prop-
erty is a direct tax. A tax on income from property may amount 
to a tax on property but is it a direct tax ?15 · 
The question with which we are here concerned is whether this 
case yields a definition of a direct tax. The court began by giving 
the economic definition of a direct tax, that is, shiftability was 
made the test, and asserted that to be the true definition, but imme-
diately left this view with the assertion that "we must inquire what 
the framers of the Constitution intended the term to mean." In 
only one other instance do we find Chief Justice Fur.I.ER alluding, 
even in a remote way, to the economic definition; and that was when 
he said there was no possible means of escape from payment of the 
tax on the part of real property holders. Because of this one vague 
reference and the fact that he nowhere attempted to show that this 
tax could not be shifted, we feel that the Chief Justice was not sure 
of his ground here and, therefore, diG not rely upon this definition 
for his decision. We take this view despite the fact that Justice 
WHITE, in his dissenting opinion, strongly intim~ted that the court 
was construing the word "direct" in its economic sense, instead of 
in accordance with its meaning in the Constitution. 
Chief Justice 'FULLER made much of the argument that the words 
were used in the Constitution in "their natural and obvious import," 
but nowhere did he tell us what that import was, and the-mere asser-
tion gets us nowhere. 
The G_hief Justice appeared extremely wary of making a positive 
statement which might be construed as some kind of a definition of 
:11 The decision may be partly due to the poor handling qi the- case on the part 
of the Government. It practically admitted that the tax on incomes from state and 
municipal securities was a tax on the source while contending that a tax on rent was 
not a true on land but a tax on so much personal property irrespective of its origin. 
It asserted that "rents in tho pocket of the owner ar-e not insrinsically and of tltemselv• 
1and. They are money, like any other." Thus by the govemmenl'it Q'\Ul rejlfej~atation 
the tax was a tax on ~roperty though p~operty in pocket. 
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a direct tax. In the opinion we find this question. asked: "Can it 
be properly held that the Constitution, taken in its plain and obvious. 
sense, and with due regard to the circumstances attending the forma-
tion of the government, authorizes a general unapportioned tax on 
the products of the farm and the rents of real estate, although im-
posed merely because of ownership and with no possible means of 
escape from payment, as belonging to a totally different class from 
that which includes the property from whence the income pro-
ceeds ?"16 A few lines later he said the same reasoning should apply 
to the income from "capital in personalty." 
Later courts have seized upon the phrase used here, "because of 
ownership," and interpreted it as an essential part of the opinion. 
The income tax, however, does not reach real estate which is not 
productive of an income although the element of ownership is the 
same as of that which produces an income. The income tax also 
reaches incomes which are not from property or incomes which may 
be partly from property and partly from other sources. Can it be 
said then that the tax was levied merely because of ownership? The 
court evidently realized the difficulties and presented the thought 
merely in the form of a question. It is hardly a reasonable inter-
pretation to say that the court considered this phrase essential for 
arriving at the decision given. 
The theory developed in some of the ea.rlier cases of making the 
possibility of apportionment the test of a direct tax was thrown 
overboard entirely in this case. 
Thus the court overthrew the old construction of a "direct tax" 
which had held for a hundred years and gave us no comprehensive 
definition in its place. It was left to succeeding courts to try to-
r~ad into this opinion a workable definition. 
DEVELOPMENT FROM THE POLLOCK CASE TO THE SIXTEENTH 
AMENDMENT. 
'The first case after the Income Ta% decision in which the Supreme 
Court passed on the constitutionality of a tax was Nicol v. Ames,11 
A tax had been levied upon sales at business exchanges. The 
court's position here was 'a difficult one. It had now evidently per-
suaded itself that the principle underlying the Pollock case was that 
a tax upon property as such is a direct tax. At the same time it 
was confronted by counsel's argument that a tax upon sales is a 
tax upon the commodities sold,-a proposition supported hy Brown 
lS 158 u. s. 627.628. 
"173 U. S. so11. (18gg). 
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v. Maryland.18 The logical conclusion, obviously, was to admit that 
a tax on sales was a direct tax and this indeed the court impliedly 
does do, notwithstanding the fact that a tax on sales had hitherto 
always ·been considered an excise. At the same time; however, the 
court did not wish to declare this particular tax void. The diffi-
culty was accordingly solved by declaring the tax to be not upon. 
the sales but "upon the privilege, opportunity, or facility offered at 
boards of trade or exchanges for the transaction of the business 
mentioned in the act." "It is not," the court proceeded, "a tax upon 
the business itself which' is so transacted, but it is a duty. upon the 
facilities made use of and actually employed in the transaction of 
the business, and separate and apart from the business itself. * * * 
It is not laid upon the property at all, nor upon the profits 
of the sale thereof, nor upon the sale itself considered sep-
arate and apart from the place and the circumstances of 
the sale."10 The ominous possibilities of such a position are.,?.ppar- · 
ent, and they are not lessened .by the court's careful disavowal of 
the tax before it as a tax upon business. For even the Pollock case 
avoids classifying such taxes as direct.20 
The Federal War Revenue Act of June 13, 1898, imposed a suc-
cession tax upon legacies or distributive shares of personalty passing 
at death. It came before the Supreme Court in Knowlton v. 
1VI oore,21 where ·the court encountered a second difficulty arising 
from its interpret;ition of the Income Ta% case. Counsel presented 
the argument that there are certain inherent rights of ownership; 
that to tax these rights was to tax the property owned, and that the 
right of transmission was such a right. The court, however, main· 
tained that the tax was not upon an inherent right but upon a 
privilege, and gave a long historical discussion in support of this 
view.22 Nevertheless, Kno1e•lton v. 111 oore, even more clearly than 
Nicol v. Ames, interprets the Pollock case as establishing the propo-
sition that a tax upon property, either real or personal, because of 
its ownership, is a direct tax. This, however, is clearly to read into 
the earlier deeision what is not there. No doubt the definition has 
:i certain precision, but whether it is a workable definition is ques-
tionable. It is also to be noted that. in Knowlton v. Moore, as well 
as in Nicol v. Anies, the court repudiates the economic definition of 
a direct tax, and declares somewhat' darkly that in determining the 
l! 12 \Vheaton 41g. (1827). 
11 173 u. s. 519-520. 
"See 158 U •. S. 635. 
zt 178 U. S. 41. (1goo). 
11 Cf. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. us, and Murdock v. \Vard, 178 U. S. 139. 
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validity of a tax its actual, practical result!? should be considered 
rather than the abstract ideas of theorists.23 
In 1902 the court held that a tax upon manufactured tobacco iii 
the hands of a dealer, not the manufacturer, was an excise and not 
a direct tax.21 Justice BREWER said in part: "It is not a tax upon 
property as such, but upon certain kinds [italics are mine] of prop-
erty, having reference to their origin and their intended use." Again 
the history of excises was relied upon in support of the result ar-
rived at, but no reasoning was given to show why the tax before 
the court was not a tax upon property. The truth is that the argu-
ment of counsel that the tax was one upon personal property and, 
accordingly, by the Pollock case, a direct tax is logically unaI).swer-
able, and the.court's only escape from it was to quote definitions of 
"excise" which could never have been framed in face of the idea 
that a tax on personalty because of ownership is a direct tax. 
In Thomas v. United States25 the court passed upon the constitu-
tionality of a stamp tax on sales of certificates of stock which was 
imposed by the revenue act of 1898. Here the court was again 
brought face to face with the propositions, advanced ·by the attor-
neys, that (I) "the right of sale and transfer is an inherent attri-
bute of property," and (2) "a tax upon the sale of articles is in 
substance a tax upon the articles themselves." This was a· clear 
-case of a tax on sales. The court, however, denied that it was a tax 
on sales and asserted that it was a privilege tax and therefore in-
direct, on the ground that the sale of stocks was but a particular 
business transaction in the exercise of the privilege enjoyed by cor-
porations which are permitted to dispose of property in the form of 
·certificates. The court said the words duties, imposts and excises 
''were used comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties . 
imposed on importation, consumption, manufacture and sale of 
certain commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, 
vocations, occupations and the like." We thus obtain a form of 
definition for '"indirect" tax, but its lack of harmony with the logic 
of the court's view of ·"direct" tax is palpable. Just as in Patton v. 
Brady, the court was willing to except "certain commodities" from 
the rule in the Income Tax- case and thereby to emasculate the 
whole proposition. 
In short, in the cases just reviewed, there is a clear inconsistency 
<>n the part of the court in trying to justify on historical ground, 
as indirect, taxes which by the definition avowed by it were direct. 
•In this case it was also decided that uniformity, in the aense of the Constitu· 
tion, meant simply geographical uniformity. 
"Patton v. ;Brady. 184 U. S. 6o8. (1902). 
• lga U. S.·363. .(1904}. 
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The Pollock case rejected the historical view. Later courts have 
tried to straddle the two positions but they will not drive together. 
The same revenue act of I898 imposed a tax upon the gross 
annual receipts, in excess of $250,000, of any corporation or com-
pany carrying on or doing the business of refining sugar. The court 
held this to be a tax on the business of refining sugar ~nd not on 
property.26 It was, therefore, an excise and not repugnant to the 
Constitution. Again we perceive the practical effort of the court 
directed to sustaining the tax before it, matched, however, by a 
curious tenacity in adhering to an unworkable doctrine.27 
The Corporation Income Ta~ case has much significance in the 
development of the theory of a direct tax, and shows once more 
the court's extreme hesitancy in qeclaring a tax to be a tax upon 
property.28 The court here, just as in Knowlton v. ltfoore, inter-
preted the Pollock case as standing for the principle that a tax im-
posed upon property simply because of ownership is a direct tax. 
Nevertheless the jncome tax upon the doing of. business under cor-
porate organization was held to be "an excise upon the particular 
privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity." The tax is 
not payable, the court continued, unless business is Ca.rried on in 
the designated capacity. True, the tax was in form an income taf{, 
but this was because the income was the measure of the privileg~: 
Nor was it a valid objection that the measure included, "in part at 
least, property which as such could not be directly taxed." Using 
this same . reasoning why could not a tax on the incomes of in-
dividuals::-be. called a tax on tfie privilege of doing business-the 
business .. of investing funds, of· renting real estate,-in short, of 
using property to produce income? The distinction is a narrow one 
at least.29 
., Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397. (1904). 
"1 In South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, (1905), a federal revenue 
officer had collected a certain sum from a state dispenser of liquors under the federal 
internal revenue laws. The court held that the ta."'< was not imposed upon any property 
belonging to the state, but was. a charge on a business before any profits were realized 
therefrom. 
:s Flint v. Stone Tracy Co .. 220 U. S. 107. (19n). 
"On the basis of this decision Mr. Underwood strongly supported an excise-tax 
bill in the House in 1912, which purported to extend to perso.ns a tax similar to the 
one on incomes of corporations. It was purely an income tax as proposed. but Mr. 
Underwood sought to evade the decision in the Pollock case by calling it a tax on th~ 
carrying on of business and then proposed to measure the business, and hence the 
tax, by the amount of income from all sources. The term "business., was to be given 
a wide scope; for instance one who owns a house and rents it is in the business of 
renting real estate. 
It would be interesting to know just how the court would have treated such a 
tax. It probably would have said that individuals had no privilege of doing business 
in a particular way as corl?orations had. Co1,g. Record, 62 Cong., :znd sess. pp. 
3497-3526. 
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THE BRUSHABER CASE AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
The Constitution recognizes but two classes of taxes, namely: 
(I) direct taxes, which should be levied according to the rule of 
apportionment; and ( 2) duties, imposts and excises, which should 
be levied according to the rule of uniformity. During the whole 
history of taxation the Supreme Court has never recognized any tax 
as falling intermediately between these two classes and i:qcluded by 
neither. It had come to be recognized that all taxes fell within one 
of these two classes. \Vbcn the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted 
which provided that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several states, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration," the general opinion was that the amendment took 
this particular direct tax and relieved it of the.necessity of being 
apportioned, thereby ci;eating an exception to the constitutional rule 
that all direct taxes should be apportioned. However, when the 
amendment came up for interpretation in Brushaber v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Conipany,30 the court realized that if this interpre-
tation were given there would be no constitutional limitations ·or re-
strictions whatever on the power to lay and collect income taxes, 
because they would be relieved of the rule of apportionment and at 
the same time would not come under the rule of uniformity. To 
the cottrt this was· undesirable and, therefore, tlieir interpretation 
of the Sixteenth Amendment required a new interpretation of the 
opinion set forthin the Pollock case. 
Chief Justice WHITE in the opinion said that "the conclusion 
reached in the Pollock case did not in any degree involve holding 
that 'income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class 
of direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary; recognized the 
fact that taxc.tion on income was in its nature an excise entitled to 
be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce 
it would amount to accomplishing the result which the requir~nient 
as to apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent, in 
which ·case the duty would arise to disregard form and consider 
substance alone, and hence subject· the tax to the regulation as 
to apportionment which otherwise as an excis~ would not apply 
to it."31 In other words the court clearly exceeded its power by 
declaring a tax: to be a direct tax, which, in fact, was not a direct 
tax, merely because its enforcement would have the same effect as 
an unapportioned direct tax. To express it in still another form, 
.. 240 U. S. l. (1916). 
ai 240 u. s. 16-17. 
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the constitutional fathers had in mind certain possible abuses of the 
taxing power and in order to remedy them they stipulated that all 
direct ta_xes should be apportioned. Then there arose a tax which 
was not a direct tax but which had the same possibilities of abuse 
that the fathers intended to remedy by the direct tax clause. There-
fore, the court deemed it its dtlty. to call such a tax a direct tax. 
The court deliberately broke the letter of the law· in order to keep_ 
Congress. from doing what the court'- thought the framers of the 
Constitution did not wish Congress to do. The Constitution was 
found wanting and the court supplied the deficiency. 
We wish, howe\rer, to disagree emphatically with the Chief Jus-· 
tice, .because· we do not see ,how any fair and reasonable interpreta-
tion of the opinion in the Pollock case would warrant such a con-
clusion. 'When the court said that a tax on the income from real 
estate ~'fell within the same class as the source whence the income 
was derived, that is, that a tax upon the realty and a tax upon the 
receipts therefrom were alike direct,'' and again: "Admitting that 
this act taxes the income of property irrespective of its source, still 
we cannot doubt that such a tax is necessarily a direct tax in the 
meaning of the Constitution," it clearly meant that a tax on income 
from property was a direct tax, and no explanation can make it 
appear otheqvise. It is true, the anticipated ·effect of the income 
tax may have greatly influenced the court in formulating their 
opinion but that this was the basis of the decision cannot be gained 
from the opinion itself. There , was, however, no inconsistency on 
the part of Chief Justice WHITE as he held a very similar view of 
the opinion in the Pollock case at the time it was given. ·This may 
be seen in the dissenting opinion of Justice WHITE 'with which Jus-
tice HARLAN concurred.32 The Brieshaber case clearly shows, there-. ' 
="The right to tax, and not the effects which may follow from its lawful exercise, 
is the only judicial question which this court is called upon to consider. If an in-
direct tax, which the Constitution has not ,subjected to the rule of apportionment, is 
to be held to be a direct tax, because it , will bear upon aggregations of property in 
different sections· of the country, according to the extent of such aggregations, then 
the power is denied to Congress to .do that which the Constitution authorizes, because 
the exercise of a lawful power is supposed to work out a result which, in the opini<>n 
of the court, was not contemplated by the fathers. If this be sound, then every nues· 
tion which has been determined in our past history is now still open for judicial re· 
consh-uction.'' 157 U. S. 643. · · 
In this connection it is interesting to note that Justice Patterson in his opinion 
in the Hylton case said that the direct tax clause of the Constitution wa~ made in favor 
of the South em States, which had many· slaves and extensive tracts of territory, thinly 
settled and not very productive; while the other states had bt1t Jew slaves and several 
-of them a limited territory, well settled and highly cultivated. "Congress in such case, 
might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and land· in ·every part of the Union after 
the same rate or measure; so much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre 
ln the second." 
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fore that the court has forsaken the decision in the Pollock case 
and has accepted the view of Justice WHITE as expressed in his dis-
'senting opinion. 
Having given this interpretation of the Pollock case the Chief 
Justice proceeded in the Brushaber case to interpret the Sixteenth 
Amendment, which, he maintained, did not create a new kind of 
tax. The whole purpose of the amendment was to relieve all in-
come taxes, when imposed, from the necessity of being apportioned 
because of consideration of the source whence the income was de-
rived. It intended to do away with "the principle upon which the 
Pollock case was decided, that is, of determining whether a tax on 
income was direct * * * by taking into view the burden which 
resulted on the property from which the income was derived." Its 
aim was "the prevention of the resort to the sources from which a 
taxed income was derived in order to cause a direct tax on the in-
come to be a direct tax on the source itself, and thereby to take an 
income tax out of the class of excises, duties, and imposts, and place 
it in the class of direct taxes." This positiqn followed logically the 
interpretation given to the Pollock case and the excuse for it .all is 
that it brough~ the income tax under the rule of uniformity. 
The C~ief .T ustice maintained. that from the time of the Hylton 
case "it had c0me to be accepted that direct taxes in the cc,mstitu-
tional sense were· confined to taxes levied directly on real estate 
because of its ownershfp." He also asserted that this same view of 
the earlier cases was held in the Pollock case. The fact is, how-
ever, that the phrase "because of ownersMp" is a recent develop-
ment in .connection with the direct tax discussion and that the use 
of it in connection with those earlier cases is reading into them 
something that is not there. 
The Brushaber case was followed by Stanton v. Baltic Mining 
Conipany,33 where the income tax law was attacked on the ground 
that a tax on the product of a mine was a direct tax on property 
because of its ownership unless adequate allowance was made for 
the exhaustion of the ore body as a result of working the mine. The 
company averred that it was taxed one per cent upon its gross re-
ceipts during the year 1914 after deducting, (I) operating and 
maintenance expenses, and ( 2) losses including depreciation arising 
from depletion of its ore deposits to the limited extent of five per 
cent of the "gross value at the mine of the output" during the year. 
The ·contention was that the five per cent deduction was an made-
quate allowance for the depletion of the ore body and therefore the 
law taxed not the mere profit arisi~g: from the operation of the mine 
30240 u. s. 103- (1916). 
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but also a portion of their principal or capital. The court largely 
evaded the issue as to whether such a tax was really an income tax 
and merely asserted that the rule established by the Sixteenth 
Amendment eovered the case. Not quite satisfied with this ex-
planation, however, the court, in order to show that the tax was 
not a direct tax on property because of ownership, relied upon the 
decision in Stratton's Independence v. Howbert3' which, aside from 
the Sixteenth Amendment, affirmed that such a tax was not a tax 
upon property as such because of its ownership, but a true excise 
levied on the results of carrying on mining operations. 
SUMMARY. 
The definition of a direct tax before 1895 was a tax directly im-
posed OJ:?. real estate and invariably such impositions as income 
taxes, inheritance taxes, and taxes on bank notes were held not to 
be direct taxes. Since the Pollock case, moreover, we see an evi-
dent desire on the part of the court to uphold the hands of Con-
gress in regard to the taxing power, with the result that no tax 
levied by Congress since that date has, as l:iefor~, been held to be 
an unapportioned direct tax. 
In the Pollock case, which stands out accordingly as a unique 
product of judicial solicitude for the salvation of society against 
itself, the bugaboo .of socialism set forth by the attorneys for the 
complainant caused the court to declare·-a tax on income from prop-
erty, real or personal, to be a direct tax. From this case has devel-
oped the present view of the court as to a 4irect tax \vhich is sub-
stantially as follows : any tax on property, real or personal, because 
of its ownership is a direct tax. In every decision, however, since 
the Pollock case the tax has been held to be not upon property be· 
cause of its ownership, but upon the peculiar right, privilege, or 
facility enjoyed or used, or upon the business involved, and valid 
as an excise. 
This definition of a direct tax is vague and unsatisfactory. What 
test will the court apply to determine whether a tax is on property 
because of ownership? None has been developed so far and in 
each ne\v case that comes up the court gropes around for somt: 
pro hac 11ice basis for a decision. Will the Bruslzabcr case be inter-
preted as overthrowing the doctrine that a tax on an inherent right 
of ownership is a direct tax upon the property owned? !£ so the 
implied view of the court in Nicol v. Ames, that a tax on sc.les in 
general is a direct tax on property, would not now hold. It may 
.. 231 u. s. 399. (1913); 
578 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
be that the court, on the basis of the Brushaber case, will finally 
go back to the definition of "direct" tax which was held before the 
Pollock case. There· is but one step· more to take. However, the 
situation at present is this,-when the court wants to uphold a tax 
law of Congress it merely says the tax is not one on property be-
cause of ownership. On the other hand,_ in many instances, if the 
court should think a particular tax undesirable it could just as 
readilv evoke a revelation from its inner consciousness that the tax 
.was 6~e on property because of ownership. 
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